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The recent literature proposes many variables as significant determinants of pollution.
This paper gives an overview of this literature and asks which of these factors have an
empirically robust impact on water and air pollution. We apply Extreme Bound
Analysis (EBA) on a panel of up to 120 countries covering the period 1960–2001.
We find supportive evidence of the existence of the environmental Kuznets curve
for water pollution. Furthermore, mainly variables capturing the economic structure
of a country affect air and water pollution.
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1. Introduction
Faced with a rapidly growing population and increasing economic activity
over the last several decades, policy-makers around the world have devoted
more and more attention to the problem of pollution. It is therefore not
surprising that many economists have joined the search for the underlying
causes of the observed environmental degradation. Earlier studies have
identified production and production-specific variables as determinants of
pollution.
Among these types of variables, GDP per capita is at a center of focus. Most
authors nowadays believe that its relationship to pollution is non-linear: the effect
on the environment is negative at early stages of development, but after a certain
threshold a higher degree of industrialization has a positive effect. Grossman and
Krueger (1995) and Selden and Song (1994) were amongst the first to examine this
particular relationship, which the latter labeled the environmental Kuznets curve
(EKC).
Another line of literature discusses the impact of globalization on pollution. On
the one hand, intensive trade patterns accelerate efficient allocations which in turn
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might lead to lower levels of pollution (e.g., Cole, 2004). On the other hand, the
so-called pollution haven hypothesis states that globalization causes dirty industrial
sectors to be located in countries with low environmental standards (e.g., Birdsall
and Wheeler, 1993).
Lately, political indicators have been introduced into the discussion; the consti-
tutional set-up of a country may explain different levels of pollution, as it relates to
economic and political freedom (e.g., Carlsson and Lundstro¨m, 2003; Neumayer,
2003; Bernauer and Koubi, 2009).
Authors like Torras and Boyce (1998) as well as Cole and Neumayer (2004)
indicate that demographic factors induce different patterns in pollution levels.
For instance, in urban areas lifestyles are bound to differ from those in more
rural regions; these differences in lifestyle might imply differences in environmental
pollution.
The existing empirical literature on the determinants of pollution suffers from
several drawbacks. First, as stated above, a wide variety of variables has been
suggested as explaining environmental contamination and there is little consensus
in the literature on which of these variables really matter. Second, most authors do
not carefully examine the sensitivity of their empirical findings. Thus, it is hard to
tell whether the variables reported to be significant in a particular regression remain
robust determinants of pollution once other potentially important explanatory
variables are included.1 Third, the majority of publications only focuses on one
particular hypothesis and limits the number of control variables; no systematic
analysis of the different hypotheses mentioned in the literature is offered. Hence,
possible interdependencies with other variables and potential omitted variable
biases are generally neglected. A final drawback of some studies is the limited
data sample. Often estimations are conducted for only one country over several
years, or for only one year over a cross-section of countries.
The aim of this article is to analyse to what extent various economic, political,
and demographic variables that have been suggested in the literature are robust
determinants of water and air pollution. For this purpose, we first provide a
detailed overview of the literature from which we subsequently derive a list of 19
explanatory variables. We then estimate a panel data model including up to 120
countries for the period 1960–2001 and apply the so-called Extreme Bounds
Analysis (EBA) to examine to what extent these variables are robust determinants
of environmental degradation. To the best of our knowledge, this approach to
check for the robustness of a relationship has not been used in this field of research
before. It has been widely employed in, for instance, the economic growth literature
(e.g., Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; Sturm
and de Haan, 2005). As pointed out by Temple (2000), presenting only the results
of the model preferred by the author(s) of a particular publication can be
..........................................................................................................................................................................
1 This paper uses the term robustness to reflect the insensitivity of empirical findings with respect to one
variable to changes in the set of conditioning variables.
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misleading. Extreme Bounds Analysis is a fairly neutral means to check robustness
issues and compare the validity of conflicting findings in empirical research.
This article uses biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) as the measure of water
pollution and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and—to a lesser extent—sulfur
dioxide (SO2) as measures of air pollution. All three variables are widely accepted
environmental proxies which have been well-documented over extended periods of
time for most countries in the world.
For water pollution, we find support for the EKC hypothesis. For air pollution,
results suggest that if a turning point exists it occurs at income levels that are not
actually observed in the real world. Hence, we can only confirm a concave rela-
tionship between GDP per capita and CO2. It is therefore not clear that the world
will be able to simply grow its way out of the greenhouse gas problem.
Furthermore, air pollution is not robustly linked to most of our political-institu-
tional variables directly, implying that no straightforward policy conclusions can be
drawn.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, the relevant literature
is reviewed and the variables on which we focus are introduced. Then, the meth-
odological approach is discussed. Next, the results are reported and interpreted.
The final section summarizes and concludes.
2. Literature overview and variables selection
Table A4 (in Appendix 2, available online) summarizes 16 studies on the determi-
nants of pollution that have been published since the beginning of the 1990s. The
papers were selected to maximize the number of potential determinants. The se-
lection is by no means exhaustive. As the table makes clear, not only have previous
studies introduced a wide array of explanatory variables, also well over 20 different
measures of pollution have been used. The four most often used measures are CO2
and SO2 emissions (to proxy air pollution) plus BOD and the level of dissolved
oxygen (to proxy water pollution).
As our measure of water pollution we take BOD from the World Development
Indicators CD-ROM (2003) as published by the World Bank which covers the years
1980–2001 (see World Bank, 2003a). According to the European Environment
Agency ‘BOD is a measure of how much dissolved oxygen is being consumed as
microbes break down organic matter. A high demand, therefore, can indicate that
levels of dissolved oxygen are falling, with potentially dangerous implications for
the river’s biodiversity’.2 It is available for a maximum of 114 countries starting in
1980, i.e., totaling roughly 2,000 observations. The data on water pollution are
probably the most accurately measured pollution data, since sampling techniques
are well understood and common in all countries. Additionally, data on water
..........................................................................................................................................................................
2 See http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/biochemical-oxygen-demand-in-rivers.
570 determinants of pollution
pollution are more readily available than other emissions data as most industrial
pollution control programs start by regulating emissions of organic water pollu-
tants. Since the level of dissolved oxygen is basically the reciprocal to BOD but not
as readily available for as many countries, we choose to exclude this measure.
With respect to air pollution, our main variable of interest is the level of CO2
emissions also reported in World Bank (2003a).3 It is available for up to 188
countries covering 1960–99 with a total of over 6,500 observations. Unfortunately,
these data are (necessarily) based on estimates and not measured directly. Origi-
nally, the data stem from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center
(CDIAC). Accordingly, ‘[t]hese calculations are derived from data on fossil fuel
consumption, based on the World Energy Data Set maintained by the UNSD and
from data on world cement manufacturing based on the Cement Manufacturing
Data Set maintained by the US Bureau of Mines’ (World Bank, 2003b, p.245-6).
Keeping this caveat in mind, these are likely to be the best data available for a large
set of countries.
We have also included SO2 emissions as a pollutant in our set-up. The latest and
largest data source on SO2 is Stern (2005b) To construct the data set Stern has
combined various sources and used different methods: ‘For the remaining countries
and for missing years for countries with some published data, [he] interpolate[s] or
extrapolate[s] estimates using either an econometric emissions frontier model, an
environmental Kuznets curve model, or a simple extrapolation, depending on the
availability of data’ (Stern, 2005b, p.163). This data gives a decent overview of
the evolution of sulfur emission during the past decades for a substantial part of
the world. However, using estimation procedures in the data generating process
calls for caution in this part of our analysis and, hence, we will not concentrate
upon those results.4
We will henceforth focus on the results using BOD and CO2 to proxy water and
air pollution, respectively. To capture size effects we scale our pollution measures
by population and subsequently take natural logarithms. With a correlation coef-
ficient of 0.762 water and air pollution are strongly related to each other (see
Table A2 in Appendix 1). Further evidence for strong comovement is presented
in Fig. 1 showing a plot of the levels of water against air pollution for the year 1995.
The next step is to select our list of explanatory variables. For that we conduct an
extensive literature survey. Based upon these previous studies, Table A4 (in
Appendix 2, available online) points out that a rather large and heterogeneous
set of variables has been suggested in the past. Furthermore, the empirical results
for particular variables are rather mixed. The remainder of this section describes the
..........................................................................................................................................................................
3 Unless mentioned otherwise, all data stem from World Bank (2003a) to ensure consistency.
4 For reason of comparison, we have summarized the SO2 results in Table A3 in Appendix 2, available
online.
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19 variables and their underlying hypotheses, which we have distilled out of this
literature for further use in our own empirical analysis.
From a theoretical point of view, the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) is the
most prominent hypothesis. Instead of an inverted U-shaped relationship between
income inequality and per capita income—as suggested by Kuznets (1955)—the
EKC presumes such a relationship between per capita emissions and per capita
income.
A vast number of theories have been proposed that lead to such an inverted
U-shaped relationship, each of them relying on specific assumptions. Since it is
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these various set-ups, we restrict our focus
to the models of Grossman and Krueger (1995), Antle and Heidebrink (1995), and
Torras and Boyce (1998).
Grossman and Krueger discriminate between a scale, a composition, and a tech-
nology effect of growth on the environment. The scale effect describes the economic
degradation due to a boost in economic activity. If economic activity is increasing,
more resources are used for production and, hence, more dissipation occurs. The
composition effect describes the change in economic structures caused by growth.
For instance, the transition from an industrial society to a service-based one is likely
to have a positive effect on its environmental quality. An example of a negative
effect of a change in demand patterns on the environment is given by Chamon et al.
(2008) who show that car ownership increases rapidly once income rises above
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Fig. 1 Water and air pollution in 1995
Note: The three letter country codes refer to the World Bank classification.
Air pollution is proxied by log per capita CO2 emissions while water pollution
is measured by the log of per capita biological oxygen demand.
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a threshold.5 Finally, the technology effect specifies the substitution of obsolete,
dirty, and inefficient technology by more sophisticated and ‘cleaner’ methods.
Other studies argue that the income elasticity of environmental demand is chan-
ging, see, e.g., Antle and Heidebrink (1995). As income grows, a higher standard of
living is achieved which might lead individuals to care more about environmental
protection. In most societies, this changing attitude will have an impact on actual
environmental policy.
Moreover, Torras and Boyce (1998) use sufficiently functioning markets as an
explanation for the environmental Kuznets curve. Early stage industries are char-
acterized by heavy exploitation of natural resources. This in turn significantly
reduces the available stock of resources. Conditioning on an effective market mech-
anism in pricing resources, a consequence of such exploitation will be rising prices.
Higher prices increase pressure to switch to less resource-intensive technologies.
Again this leads to a hump-shaped relationship between pollution and income.6
Studies like Shafik (1994), Selden and Song (1994), and Grossman and Krueger
(1995) report empirical evidence in favour of the EKC.7 However, results presented
by, e.g., Arrow et al. (1995) indicate that this finding is not necessarily robust.8 We
use the level, squared, and cubic transformations of (the log of) real GDP per capita
(LGDPPC, LGDPPC2, LGDPPC3) to test the EKC theory.9
According to, e.g., Cole (2004), trade may reduce pollution emissions due to
greater competitive pressure or ‘greater access to ‘greener’ production technologies’
(p.79).10 For that reason we introduce a variable representing trade intensity in
our analysis. This variable (TRADE) is defined as the ratio of imports plus exports
over GDP.
Often the trade effect is disaggregated into three components: a scale effect, a
technique effect, and a composition effect. The scale effect refers to the fact that
trade increases market size which presumably increases production and in turn
increases pollution. The technique effect relates to the trade-induced changes of
..........................................................................................................................................................................
5 We owe this example to an anonymous referee.
6 The argument of Torras and Boyce (1998) may be less applicable to our setting. Prices of resources are
most likely determined on world markets. Thus domestic markets may only play a minor role in
determining domestic demand.
7 For a detailed survey of theoretical and empirical studies dealing with the EKC, we refer to Dinda
(2004).
8 Some authors propose an inverted N-shaped or even a N-shaped relationship. See, e.g., Holtz-Eakin
and Selden (1995). However, often the additional turning point is out-of-sample.
9 Recently semi- and non-parametric specifications of the EKC have emerged, see, e.g., Millimet et al.
(2003) and Azomahou et al. (2006). These studies find an EKC shape very similar to ours, but often fail
to include relevant conditioning variables. We refer to Maddison (2006) for a spatial modeling approach
of the EKC.
10 This is in line with Frankel and Rose (2005) who find that trade tends to reduce pollution even after
taking into account potential simultaneity problems. However, in the case of CO2 emissions, the same
authors point toward a positive relationship. They argue that this is due to the global externality feature
of that form of pollution.
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the production technology. The composition effect stems from changes in the
country-specific composition of production caused by international specialization.
When the latter is associated with cross-country differences in environmental regu-
lation, it is commonly labeled the pollution haven hypothesis. Countries with a
comparative disadvantage in ‘dirty’ production, i.e., with strict environmental reg-
ulations, will—according to this hypothesis—outsource pollution-intensive activ-
ities. This will increase trade between nations with different comparative advantages
(Birdsall and Wheeler, 1993; Mani and Wheeler, 1998).11
Mainly because micro data is needed to analyse systematically which type of
industry has been shifted across borders, it is quite difficult to test this hypothesis
empirically. Hence, most studies end up concluding that their results do not ne-
cessarily confirm or reject the pollution haven hypothesis. Of the remaining ones,
not many are affirmative. For instance, Jaffe et al. (1995) and Cole (2004) find no
evidence in favour of this hypothesis. Since it is virtually impossible to get the
adequate micro data that match our otherwise aggregated information, we will
also not be in a position to address this question fully. As the scale, technique,
and composition effects do not all point in the same direction, the overall impact of
trade on the environment is ambiguous.
In a similar vein, international capital transactions might also affect national
pollution levels. Following Antweiler et al. (2001) we therefore include inward
foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP (FDIGDP) in our analysis.12
Carlsson and Lundstro¨m (2003) propose to include real GDP growth (GDPGR).
In our panel data set-up with annual observations, this variable captures the busi-
ness cycle of a country.
Income inequality plays a controversial role in the literature. The ambiguity is
highlighted by McAusland (2003). According to her theoretical model the effect of
inequality on the environment depends on the ownership distribution behind in-
equality and can thus be either beneficial or detrimental.13 The empirical literature
is ambiguous. Torras and Boyce (1998) argue that asset ownership of high income
inhabitants yields a net increase in economic growth, i.e., more pollution. As this
group possesses both substantial economic as well as political power, greater
..........................................................................................................................................................................
11 Copeland and Taylor (2004) make a distinction between the pollution haven hypothesis, which is the
hypothesis that a reduction in trade barriers will cause a shift of polluting industries to countries with
weaker regulations and the pollution haven effect, which suggests that weaker environmental regulations
will affect trade flows.
12 Cole et al. (2006) extend the pollution haven hypothesis literature to FDI and examine whether it
influences environmental regulation.
13 In case large but poor parts of society own shares of firms using clean technologies, more inequality
might actually lead to an improvement of the environment. However, the overall sign of the relationship
also depends upon the terms of trade. McAusland (2003) assumes that in a closed economy pollution
policy would make dirty goods more expensive and hence alter the terms of trade between dirty and
clean goods. A majority of the poor owning clean capacities would thus prefer a less stringent policy.
Nevertheless, assuming an open economy facing fixed world prices, the same majority would prefer
more stringent policies in order to keep the terms of trade stable.
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inequality leads to more pollution. A contrasting finding is presented by Gassebner
et al. (2008). They show both theoretically and empirically that the declining
economic significance of the industrial sector, associated with falling industrial
income shares and a lower political weight of blue-collar workers, tends to increase
environmental regulation and thereby leads to less pollution.
Hence, we introduce the variable INEQUAL. It is taken from the University of
Texas Inequality Project (2001) and is based on the United Nations International
Development Organization’s (UNIDO) database of payments. The income inequal-
ity measure is derived from the between-groups component (measured across in-
dustry sectors within each country) of Theil’s T statistic.14 As individual data are
often not available, the sum of the between group elements is a reasonable lower
bound for Theil’s T statistic in the population.15
Carlsson and Lundstro¨m (2003) introduce the indices of economic freedom
(ECFREE) and political freedom (POLFREE) as potential determinants of pollu-
tion.16 They claim that economic freedom leads to a more efficient allocation of
resources and therefore to a lower level of emissions. The intuitive reasoning
behind POLFREE is that it is easier for people to express their preferences for
higher environmental standards in a politically more open system.
Other politically motivated variables included in our analysis are a dummy
variable measuring whether or not the party of the chief executive has a left-
wing orientation (LEFT), the number of years the chief executive has been in
office (YRSOFFC), a dictatorship dummy (DICT), and a second measure of dem-
ocracy (DEMOC). Our variable LEFT is adapted from Neumayer (2003, 2004) who
suggests that despite more traditional political objectives, generally driven by blue-
collar workers’ interests, a higher degree of sympathy for environmental protection
by left-wing governments is possible.17 The next two variables, YRSOFFC and
DICT, are suggested by Klick (2002). First, he reasons that the longer a government
is in power the less willing it is to enhance pollution controls as it faces diminishing
returns of staying in power over time. Second, he claims that a dictator might take
care of the environment to secure his leading position; a dictator has a limited
number of instruments at hand to remain in power and might have stronger
incentives to invest in environmental protection rather than, e.g., schooling.18
..........................................................................................................................................................................
14 The between-groups component equals
P
pj j/ log (j/) where pj is the employment share and j
and  reflect the group average and population income, respectively.
15 For more details see http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/. For an overview on the different inequality measures
including the Theil inequality measure, see http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/tutorials/intro_ineq_studies.ppt.
16 We retrieve both indicators from Gwartney et al. (2003) and Freedom House (1999), respectively.
POLFREE is the average of the two Freedom House indices, i.e., civil liberties and political rights.
17 Neumayer, among other things, argues that especially the poor and the working class suffer from
environmental degradation.
18 The variable DICT is calculated out of the Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness (EIEC)
included in the Database of Political Institutions as collected and described by Beck et al. (2001).
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On the other hand, Congleton (1992) contends that autocratic countries should
have lower environmental standards. He believes that autocratic rulers have a
shorter time horizon. Consequently, their incentives to invest in environmental
protection are lower. To test his hypothesis Congleton includes the democracy
score from the Polity IV database (Gurr et al., 2003) which we also add to our
list of variables as DEMOC. Because of the relatively low correlation between
DEMOC and POLFREE and their somewhat different focus we include both mea-
sures in our set-up.19
Pollution might also be related to the level of education in a country. Torras and
Boyce (1998) as well as Klick (2002) include measures of education as control
variables in their respective set-up. In the spirit of Lipset (1959), who argues that
education is at least a necessary condition for democracy, higher education can be
considered a prerequisite for a higher demand for a clean environment. We include
both primary education (PRIMEDU) and the illiteracy rate among adults (ILLIT)
in our set-up.
Following, e.g., Klick (2002) and Borghesi (2006), we include (the log of) popu-
lation density (LPOPDENS). The effect of this variable is a priori ambiguous,
however. On the one hand, if more people live in a given area the effect of individ-
ual pollution aggravates. Thus a high population density may lead to more pollu-
tion. On the other hand, Stern (2005a) argues that a higher population density may
lead to lower per capita pollution emissions; as more people are potentially affected
by pollution the benefit of abatement increases.
As a second demographic variable, we use the share of urban population in total
population (URBAN). Cole and Neumayer (2004) argue that means of transports,
like cars, buses, etc., are more intensively used in urbanized areas as compared to
rural parts of a country. Moreover, food and other consumer goods have to be
transported into cities. Both examples suggest higher levels of pollution in an
economy that is more urbanized. On the other hand, citizens living in urbanized
areas are directly exposed to industrial pollution and therefore political pressure to
reduce pollution might rise (Damania et al., 2003).
The industrial sector is usually considered to generate more pollution than the
service sector. For that reason, Neumayer (2003) argues that the industry share can
help to explain the level of pollution in a country. We introduce such an industri-
alization measure both in terms of output (INDSHGDP) as well as in terms of
labour input (INDSHEMP) in our analysis. Although at first glance it might seem
that these two variables quantify the same concept, this need not necessarily be the
case. From a theoretical stance, INDSHGDP measures the relative importance of
..........................................................................................................................................................................
19 For a discussion on the difference between the two democracy measures see Aidt and Gassebner
(2010) and Vreeland (2008).
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the manufacturing sector in an economy.20 When controlling for this, INDSHEMP
can be interpreted as measuring the labour intensity of the industry sector.
Especially due to technological changes these two variables do not have to move
in parallel. For instance, assume that a technological shock increases productivity
per worker. If employment remains unaltered then INDSHEMP is unaffected.
However, INDSHGDP rises in this case. This theoretical reason is reinforced
by a rather low correlation coefficient of 0.375 between these two measures (see
Table A2 in Appendix 1).21 INDSHEMP may also account for the pressure from
industrial workers for lower regulations and hence could lead to a higher level of
pollution (Damania et al., 2003; Gassebner et al., 2008).
Besides the degree of industrialization, the composition of a country’s energy
sector might play an important role. In line with Neumayer (2003), we therefore
include the share of electricity production from oil sources in total electricity pro-
duction (OILENERGY).22 Neumayer (2003) includes the amount of commercial
energy used to produce one dollar of output. Conditioning on the characteristics of
an economy, this variable proxies for the level of energy efficiency in the produc-
tion process. However, if an EKC exists it most likely would work through altering
the amount of energy used per one dollar of output. Hence we opt to exclude this
variable from our analysis.23
As a final economic structure variable, we include (the log of) the use of fertilizer
(LFERT) into our list of potential explanatory variables. Cole and Elliott (2003)
suggest that higher fertilizer consumption increases the level of water pollution.
Besides the straightforward effect that fertilizer has on water pollution, it seems
reasonable to assume that it may also help explain the level of air pollution. First,
one can interpret this variable as a measure of the general attitude toward envir-
onmental protection. For instance, in an economy that heavily uses fertilizer, the
awareness level of carbon dioxide produced by cars, by burning oil, etc., might not
be very high either. Another aspect, which seems predominant in low income
countries, is that producing fertilizer is a plain but very pollutive production pro-
cess. The presence of such ‘dirty’ industries increases both water and air pollution.
This leaves us with a list of 19 explanatory variables covering in total up to 120
countries over the period 1960–2001. For a complete overview concerning sources
and specification of the variables we refer to Table A1 (in Appendix 1).
..........................................................................................................................................................................
20 It would also be interesting to have a closer look at non-manufacturing industrial GDP as this often
includes potentially dirty sectors such as mining and power generation. However, lack of data forces us
to concentrate on manufacturing industrial GDP.
21 The low correlation is not driven by the use of panel data. We check this by calculating the correla-
tions of the between and within components. The resulting correlation are 0.47 and 0.46, respectively.
22 Obviously oil is neither the only nor the most polluting energy source used in electricity production.
However, data limitations force us to restrict our attention to oil.
23 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. In a previous working paper version of this paper,
Gassebner et al. (2006), we included energy use per unit of GDP. The empirical relevance of the EKC
hypothesis is not fundamentally affected by this.
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3. Model
We employ (variants of) the so-called Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) as suggested
by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) to examine which explanatory
variables are robustly related to our dependent variables. To the best of our know-
ledge, this has never been done before in this line of literature, although there are
some very good reasons to apply this methodology.24
EBA has been widely used in the economic growth literature. The central diffi-
culty in that line of research—which also applies to the literature on the determi-
nants of pollution—is that several different models may all seem reasonable, but
yield different conclusions about the parameters of interest. Indeed, a glance at the
studies summarized in Table A4 (in Appendix 2, available online) illustrates this
point. The results of these studies sometimes differ substantially. At the same time,
most authors do not offer a careful sensitivity analysis to examine how robust their
conclusions are.
The EBA can be exemplified as follows. Equations of the following general form
are estimated:
Y ¼ M þ F þ Z þ u; ð1Þ
where Y is the dependent variable; M is a vector of ‘standard’ explanatory variables;
F is the variable of interest; Z is a vector of up to three possible additional ex-
planatory variables (following Levine and Renelt, 1992), which according to the
literature may be related to the dependent variable; and u is an error term. The
extreme bounds test as originally proposed by Leamer (1983) for variable F says
that if the lower extreme bound for —i.e., the lowest value for  minus two
standard errors—is negative, while the upper extreme bound for —i.e., the high-
est value for  plus two standard errors—is positive, Y is not robustly related to the
variable F.
As argued by Temple (2000), it is rare in empirical research that we can say with
certainty that some model dominates all other possibilities in all dimensions. In
these circumstances, it makes sense to provide information about how sensitive the
findings are to alternative modeling choices. While EBA provides a relatively simple
means of doing exactly this, it has been criticized in the literature.
Sala-i-Martin (1997) rightly argues that the test applied in the Extreme Bounds
Analysis is too strong. If the distribution of the parameter of interest has some
positive and some negative support, then one is bound to find one regression for
which the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions are run. We will
therefore not only report the extreme bounds, but also the percentage of the
..........................................................................................................................................................................
24 Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) as introduced by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) is a
somewhat more sophisticated method. The idea builds on Raftery (1995) and Raftery et al. (1997).
However, because of the prerequisite of strongly balanced data it is not feasible in our setting. For studies
on pollution using means of Bayesian Model Averaging we refer to Begun and Eicher (2008) and Lamla
(2009).
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regressions in which the coefficient of the variable F is statistically different from
zero at the 5%-level. Moreover, instead of analysing just the extreme bounds of the
coefficient estimates of a particular variable, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s suggestion
and analyse the entire distribution. We also report the unweighted parameter es-
timate of  and its standard deviation, as well as the unweighted cumulative dis-
tribution function (CDF(0)). The latter shows the fraction of the cumulative
distribution function lying on each side of zero. CDF(0) indicates the larger of
the areas under the density function either above or below zero; in other words,
regardless of whether this is CDF(0) or 1-CDF(0). So CDF(0) will always be a
number between 0.5 and 1.0. However, in contrast to Sala-i-Martin, we use the
unweighted instead of the weighted CDF(0). The criterion for considering a vari-
able to be robustly related to a pollution measure is the CDF(0) value. Sala-i-
Martin (1997) suggested considering a variable to be robust if the CDF(0) criterion
is greater than 0.90. Instead we follow Sturm and de Haan’s (2005) proposal to use
a stricter threshold value of 0.95 to take account of the two-sided nature of the test.
Another objection to the EBA is that the initial partition of variables in the M
and in the Z vector is likely to be rather arbitrary. Still, as pointed out by Temple
(2000), there is no reason why standard model selection procedures (such as testing
down from a general specification) cannot be used in advance to identify variables
that seem to be particularly relevant. Furthermore, some variables are included in
the large majority of studies and are by now rather common in the pollution
literature. Using a combination of general-to-specific modeling and theoretical
considerations, we started with all 21 explanatory variables listed in Table A1 (in
Appendix 1) to set up our baseline model.
In our view, the inclusion of GDP variables in the M vector to capture the EKC
argument is evident. Even if one does not believe in the EKC in a strict sense it is
rather likely that production of goods and services leads to pollution. In the lit-
erature the functional form of the EKC sometimes differs. For that reason, we have
checked whether the relationship is linear, quadratic (hump-shaped relationship)
or of an even higher order (inverted N-shape relationship). Our results clearly
suggest the need of a quadratic term when describing the relationship between
GDP and especially water pollution. Hence, we are able to confirm an inverted
U-shaped relationship. Given the better fit to the data when using the squared
specification, we leave out the cubic term.
4. Results
An important step in qualifying the robustness of our estimation output is to
discuss causality and endogeneity aspects. So far, no study in the EKC literature
that we are aware of dwells upon this topic. In our view, an effective way of
evaluating the relevance of this problem is to utilize lagged explanatory variables.
When we run the EBA employing lagged variables the results remain virtually
unchanged as compared to the outcomes with contemporaneous variables.
Correlation coefficients comparing the results of the two variable sets range
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between 0.95 to 0.99. It leads us to conclude that endogeneity is in our case not of
major importance. Furthermore, as the significance of the proposed variables
increases on average when using lagged values, causality seems to point in the
desired direction. In the remainder we will concentrate on the results when using
lagged variables.25 Further robustness tests on our EBA results will be presented at
the end of this section.
Before turning to the regression results, we first check for stationarity of our
dependent variables by using the test proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999). In each
case, we can clearly reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity.26 To ensure the
generality of our results, we follow the most rigorous empirical approach and run
our analysis using fixed country and year effects as well as clustered standard errors.
To check the robustness of the baseline model with respect to model specification
all combinations of up to three variables out of the remaining 18 variables are
added. The top part of Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results of these of 1,159
combinations for the baseline model. The variables are sorted according to the
estimated CDF(0) values. Both GDP variables are highly significant according to
the CDF(0) criterion of Sala-i-Martin (1997) for BOD while the evidence of the
robustness of the squared GDP term is mixed for CO2.
The EBA results for the baseline model strongly support the EKC hypothesis in
particular for water pollution. The negative coefficient of squared GDP per capita
suggests that there indeed exists a non-linear relationship between per capita GDP
and both pollution variables.27 To validate an inverted U-shape relationship, we
need to know whether or not the implied turning point is within sample. Therefore,
for both models, we calculate the implied EKC-turning point for each of the 1,159
regressions. In this way, we are able to give a much more detailed assessment of the
EKC-turning point as commonly done in this line of literature.
Most of the turning points for CO2 are far out of sample (see Table 3 for the
descriptive statistics). Hence, at least within sample, the relationship between CO2
emissions and GDP per capita is rather concave than of an inverted U-shape nature.
Figure 2 shows the histogram of the turning points for water pollution. It is based
on 1,159 point estimates and can be interpreted as a graphical approximation of the
distribution of turning points when all estimated models receive an equal weight. In
line with Cole (2004), we find the median turning point for BOD—at a GDP per
capita level of approximately 26,800 US $ (measured in constant 1995 prices)—to
be in-sample. It seems that, since water pollution has somewhat less of an inter-
national public good character and becomes apparent much sooner than CO2
..........................................................................................................................................................................
25 Results using contemporaneous variables are available upon request.
26 The test statistics and p-values are: LCO2PC, 
2(376) = 742.07, p-value = 0.00; LSO2PC,
2(340) = 491.80, p-value = 0.00; LBODPC, 2(284) = 405.82, p-value = 0.00.
27 Throughout the remainder of the paper when interpreting the effect of an explanatory variable, we are,
due to our set-up, speaking of lagged effects. However, in order to enhance readability, we do not
explicitly state this every time.
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emissions, actions against water pollution are taken at a clearly earlier stage of
economic development. Furthermore, the out-of-sample turning point for CO2
calls for an active environmental policy; we do not find support for the claim
that one can simply ‘grow out’ of the problem. The global character of the green-
house effect suggests that perhaps only international treaties in the spirit of the
Kyoto Protocol are able to tackle the problem.28
Table 1 Extreme Bounds Analysis for water pollution with lagged explanatory
variables
Variable Lower Upper %Sign. Unwght. Unwght. Std. Impact
bound bound CDF(0) b error rank
Base model
LGDPPC1 3.012 6.968 91.56 0.9813 1.792 0.657 
LGDPPCSQ1 0.406 0.265 77.70 0.9518 0.088 0.041 
Extended model
INDSHEMP1 0.020 0.050 96.86 0.9933 0.017 0.004 2
INEQUAL1 0.066 0.032 92.71 0.9847 0.021 0.008 4
ECFREE1 0.094 0.260 74.47 0.9609 0.063 0.032 8
URBAN1 0.029 0.099 69.91 0.9332 0.019 0.010 1
INDSHGDP1 0.043 0.044 45.09 0.8615 0.010 0.007 6
LEFT1 0.159 0.276 44.07 0.8497 0.037 0.028 15
DEMOC1 0.032 0.084 17.22 0.8207 0.011 0.011 9
DICT1 0.603 0.153 22.90 0.7903 0.054 0.049 14
LFERT1 0.240 0.402 23.40 0.7893 0.051 0.048 5
YRSOFFC1 0.018 0.032 7.70 0.7851 0.003 0.004 13
POLFREE1 0.114 0.126 6.89 0.7432 0.018 0.020 11
PRIMEDU1 0.022 0.022 7.40 0.7216 0.002 0.003 10
TRADE1 0.006 0.009 9.83 0.6399 0.001 0.001 12
OILENERGY1 0.009 0.007 3.95 0.6089 0.000 0.001 16
GDPGR1 0.037 0.015 5.57 0.6075 0.002 0.002 17
FDIGDP1 0.076 0.043 6.28 0.5915 0.000 0.007 18
ILLIT1 0.126 0.066 6.89 0.5069 0.003 0.014 7
LPOPDENS1 1.791 5.117 7.50 0.5010 0.123 0.448 3
Note: The dependent variable is water pollution (LBODPC). Results based on 1,159 (base model) and
987 (extended model) regressions respectively using country- and time-specific random effects. ‘%Sign.’
refers to the percentage of regressions in which the respective variable is significant at a 5% significance
level. ‘Impact rank’ lists the variables in descending order according to the impact resulting from a shock
of one standard deviation. The standard deviation is calculated from the between component of the
variables.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
28 Our finding relates to the theoretical literature on the realization of international environmental
agreements. Barrett (1994) and Rubio and Ulph (2006) find that there are no substantial gains from
international cooperation if states are assumed to be identical. McGinty (2007) finds that once countries
are heterogeneous, coordination leads to an overall higher level of abatement. Caplan et al. (2003) deals
explicitly with the process of coalition formation and proposes to compensate countries initially unwill-
ing to sign agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol to ensure participation.
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In the next step, each of the remaining 18 variables, one at a time, serves as the F
variable in equation (1). The other 17 variables are then, in 987 combinations, used
to check the robustness of the coefficient estimates of the particular F variable. The
results are presented in the bottom parts of Tables 1 and 2.
These tables report that two additional variables are robust determinants of both
water (BOD) and air (CO2) pollution. These are the industry share as measured by
employment (INDSHEMP) and inequality (INEQUAL). A higher industry share of
total employment induces more political pressure against pro-environmental pol-
icies. Given that we control for the industry share of GDP, the result can be
interpreted as showing that a more labour-intensive industry leads to more water
and air pollution. Possibly, a labour-intensive industrial sector is less efficient and
therefore produces more waste.
Second, both forms of pollution are robustly related to inequality (INEQUAL).
Its negative effect is broadly in line with Gassebner et al. (2008) who state that
Table 2 Extreme Bounds Analysis for air pollution with lagged explanatory
variables
Variable Lower Upper %Sign. Unwght. Unwght. Std. Impact
bound bound CDF(0) b error rank
Base model
LGDPPC1 2.076 6.107 92.15 0.9820 1.577 0.525 
LGDPPCSQ1 0.331 0.193 50.30 0.8987 0.059 0.033 
Extended model
LFERT 1 0.147 0.313 96.15 0.9928 0.111 0.033 2
INDSHEMP1 0.051 0.047 93.31 0.9880 0.015 0.005 3
DICT1 0.460 0.095 82.78 0.9704 0.095 0.044 11
INEQUAL1 0.128 0.032 81.66 0.9603 0.013 0.005 5
LPOPDENS1 1.094 2.922 55.42 0.9032 0.493 0.265 1
LEFT1 0.094 0.315 40.93 0.8731 0.049 0.032 13
INDSHGDP1 0.044 0.039 42.96 0.8388 0.007 0.006 7
ECFREE1 0.134 0.324 15.91 0.8086 0.031 0.029 12
TRADE1 0.007 0.019 17.63 0.8063 0.001 0.001 8
URBAN1 0.033 0.040 21.48 0.7844 0.006 0.006 4
OILENERGY1 0.005 0.010 17.02 0.7835 0.001 0.001 10
PRIMEDU1 0.011 0.015 16.82 0.7732 0.002 0.002 9
YRSOFFC1 0.015 0.032 13.88 0.7373 0.002 0.003 15
DEMOC1 0.051 0.073 12.56 0.6335 0.005 0.012 14
ILLIT1 0.075 0.102 2.84 0.6096 0.003 0.008 6
GDPGR1 0.019 0.020 9.73 0.5970 0.001 0.002 17
FDIGDP1 0.061 0.077 12.66 0.5534 0.001 0.007 16
POLFREE1 0.109 0.126 4.56 0.5106 0.000 0.016 18
Note: The dependent variable is air pollution (LCO2PC). Results based on 1,159 (base model) and 987
(extended model) regressions respectively using country- and time-specific random effects. ‘%Sign.’
refers to the percentage of regressions in which the respective variable is significant at a 5% significance
level. ‘Impact rank’ lists the variables in descending order according to the impact resulting from a
shock of one standard deviation. The standard deviation is calculated from the between component of
the variables.
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inequality resulting from deindustrialization and translating into diminishing pol-
itical power of the industry sector, will lead to a stricter environmental policy.
Other similarities between BOD and CO2 are that quite a number of variables do
not seem to robustly explain the observed levels of pollution. This list includes both
education variables, i.e., the illiteracy rate (ILLIT) as well as primary education
(PRIMEDU). Also most political-institutional variables, which recently received
special attention in the literature, belong to this category. Democracy (DEMOC),
political freedom (POLFREE), the duration of the executive being in office
(YRSOFFC) as well as the left-wing dummy (LEFT) have no robust direct
impact on either of our two pollution variables. This does not imply that politics
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the EKC turning points (in constant 1995 US $ per
capita)
CO2 BOD
Average turning point 2.53E + 11 61,708
Median turning point 613,547 26,831
Turning point of avg. coeff.a 575,049 27,515
Standard deviation 3.65E + 12 120,000
Kurtosis 476.08 32.50
Skewness 20.44 4.91
Note: Results are based on the coefficients of the 1,159 regressions of the base model.
aRepresents the result when first calculating the average of the 1,159 coefficients and then calculating the
turning point.
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Fig. 2 Histogram of EKC turning points—water pollution (LBODPC) (in constant
1995 US $ per capita)
Note: These frequency distributions summarize the results of the EKC turning
points of the 1,159 regressions of the base model.
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do not play a role in determining pollution. It simply means that the channel might
be an indirect one, e.g., by shaping the structural composition of a country’s
economy.29
Our pollution measures are not robustly related to the industry share of GDP
(INDSHGDP). Apparently, the industry share in employment (INDSHEMP) is
much more important. Moreover, neither water pollution nor air pollution are
significantly related to international trade (TRADE). Hence, of the three compo-
nents underlying the aggregate trade effect, the technique effect—which basically
refers to the increased availability of ‘greener’ technologies as supported by, e.g.,
Cole (2004)—cannot be dominant. It appears to be overshadowed by either the
scale or the composition effect, or both, which leaves an insignificant overall effect.
Thus we find neither evidence for a pollution reduction effect of trade nor for the
pollution haven hypothesis. Like TRADE, foreign direct investment (FDIGDP)
does not appear to play a robust role with respect to either form of pollution.
Finally, the results concerning population density (LPOPDENS) suggest that
more inhabitants per square kilometer do not directly and significantly affect a
country’s environmental quality. Urbanization (URBAN) also fails to meet the
criterion of a robust variable in both cases.
There are some notable differences between the two pollution variables with
respect to the significance of some of the remaining explanatory variables. First,
the the two remaining political-institutional variable, i.e., the dictatorship dummy
(DICT) and economic freedom (ECFREE), appear to matter but for different forms
of pollution. CO2 exhibits a relatively robust negative relationship with DICT. This
result appears at least partly in line with Klick (2002), who claims that improving
environmental quality may be a powerful and effective way to bribe the population
and secure a dictator’s tenure.
With respect to economic freedom we find evidence that an unregulated econ-
omy might not produce at a level (or with a technology) which maximizes social
welfare (as measured by water pollution, in this case). This is in contrast to
Carlsson and Lundstro¨m (2003) who report exactly the opposite finding.
Surprisingly, water pollution is not related to fertilizer usage (LFERT) but air
pollution is. While the theoretical relationship between water pollution and ferti-
lizers seems apparent, the estimation results do not reject our reasoning to include
LFERT as an explanatory variable for air pollution; LFERT might proxy either the
general attitude toward environment protection, or the importance of ‘dirty’ in-
dustries, or both.
Besides its significance, the impact of a variable is of importance. In Tables 1
and 2 the column ‘Impact rank’ refers to the ranking according to the impact of a
shock of one standard deviation of the respective variable on the level of
..........................................................................................................................................................................
29 The political system might very well determine the importance of industry and its labour intensive-
ness. By directly controlling for these factors we have beforehand eliminated such potential indirect
effects.
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pollution.30 As expected, the more robust variables are in general also the ones that
are quantitatively more important.
One of the objections against EBA is that all regressions get an equal weight, i.e.,
misspecified equations receive as much attention as others. This might bias the
outcome. In order to minimize this risk, we employ White’s test for general hetero-
scedasticity (White, 1980) and the Ramsey RESET test of functional form (Ramsey,
1969; Granger and Terasvirta, 1993; Lee et al., 1993) and exclude all potentially
problematic specifications. The White test is the most general test for heterosce-
dasticity available, i.e., hardly any assumptions with respect to the potential form of
heteroscedasticity are made. As a result the test might not only reveal the presence
of heteroscedasticity but also highlight other forms of misspecification (for details
see Thursby, 1982). As we are in particular interested in detecting potentially
misspecified equations, this property is not a shortcoming but a virtue in our case.
The RESET test is originally designed to discover potential nonlinearities in the
specification. Nowadays, it is often believed that the alternatives are not that clear
cut, implying that the test may also be used to check for omitted variables as well as
some forms of autocorrelation. The test regresses uˆ on yˆ2, yˆ3, and a constant. Under
the null hypothesis of no specification error the coefficients of yˆ2 and yˆ3 are jointly
insignificant. Although there is no consensus on what the alternative hypothesis
exactly is, rejecting the null hypothesis underlying the RESET test seems to pinpoint
serious specification problems.
Running the EBA and controlling for the quality of the residuals by using both of
our specification tests—we use a significance level of 5%—leads to the exclusion of
approximately 80% and 60% of the regressions in the BOD and CO2 cases, re-
spectively.31 Nevertheless, our results hardly change and all of our conclusions
remain valid. Most importantly, the variables that exhibit a robust relationship
to our pollution measures remain robust whereas there are no additional variables
that meet our CDF(0) criterion.
To support our findings, we take the most robust variables and estimate ‘final’
models for both water and air pollution. In the BOD model five variables meet the
criterion of having a CDF(0) of 0.95 or higher, while in the CO2 model six variables
do. These variables are all included in the respective ‘final’ model. For BOD, each
variable is highly significant and has a coefficient of the same order of magnitude as
reported in the EBA tables.32 In the case of CO2, only the inequality variable turns
out to be statistically insignificant at conventional levels. The results are summar-
ized in Tables 4 and 5.
..........................................................................................................................................................................
30 We calculate the standard deviation of the between components of the variables. Due to the non-
linearity of LGDPPC and LGDPPC2 both variables are excluded from the ranking.
31 At first glance, this appears to be a lot. However, the vast majority of the excluded regressions only
suffer from heteroscedasticity. Thus the resulting coefficients are unbiased.
32 As, of course, this cutoff is rather arbitrary, we also experimented with a cutoff of 0.9. The conclusions
do not depend upon this and reflect the findings of the EBA, i.e., the additional variables are in general
less significant.
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As compared to the EBA results, the EKC turning point implied by the ‘final’
model for water pollution is below the median—with a point estimate of about US
$5,800 (in constant 1995 prices).
As these turning points are based on the ratio of the LGDPPC- and LGDPPC2-
coefficients, potential measurement error in GDP per capita has distinctive impli-
cations as demonstrated by Kuha and Temple (2003). Given the potential sensi-
tivity of the estimated turning point to measurement error, we calculate the
confidence intervals for the marginal effects of GDP on the respective type of
pollution for the final models. These income elasticities are depicted in Fig. 3.
The markers represent the existing observations and the dashed lines denote the
90% confidence bands around the income elasticity. For the poorest countries in
our sample, a 1% increase of GDP per capita will increase water pollution levels by
approximately 1%. On the other hand, the income elasticities for the richest econ-
omies turn out to be about 0.5. We thereby confirm the existence of the EKC for
water pollution. Turning to air pollution, the estimated income elasticities range
between 0.75 and 0.5 and, most importantly, never turn negative within our
sample. Hence, here we can only confirm a concave relationship.
To test the robustness of the ‘final’ model, we check its sensitivity with respect to
the sample. As the economic freedom variable seriously restricts our sample we
Table 4 Final model—dependent variable: water pollution (LBODPC)
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4)
variable Full sample Full sample 1990s non-OECD
LGDPPC1 2.739*** 1.751*** 1.824*** 2.076***
(0.725) (0.495) (0.606) (0.508)
LGDPPCSQ1 0.158*** 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.124***
(0.041) (0.029) (0.039) (0.032)
INDSHEMP1 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.014** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
INEQUAL1 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.010* 0.018***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
ECFREE1 0.064***
(0.023)
Observations 204 941 576 562
Countries 81 110 96 87
Periods 3 19 10 19
R-Sq (within) 0.583 0.458 0.311 0.490
F-test 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.000
EKC T.P. 5,812 5,816 5,452 4,320
Note: ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%-significance level.
‘1990s’ uses only the years 1990-99, ‘non-OECD’ excludes OECD countries. All estimations include
country- and time-specific fixed effects. Clustered standard errors are given in parentheses below the
coefficient. ‘F-test’ reports the p-value of an F-test on the joint significance of the coefficients of
LGDPPC1 and LGDPPCSQ1. ‘EKC T.P.’ represents the turning point of the EKC in constant 1995
US $ per capita.
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reestimate the model leaving it out. This leaves all our findings unchanged.
Moreover, we reduce the sample to only cover the 1990s. Arguably, the world
has changed considerably and it appears that environmental awareness has
increased as compared to the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, we split the sample
across the country dimension by excluding OECD countries. One can argue that
developed and less developed countries are too different to be included in one set-
up; pooling these two groups may lead to biased coefficient estimates. In particular,
the within variation of GDP per capita could differ greatly between OECD and non-
OECD countries. As Tables 4 and 5 show our conclusions remain rather similar.
One exception is dictatorship (DICT) for air pollution which turns insignificant
when focusing on the 1990s or the non-OECD countries. Furthermore, although
the implied turning point is still out of sample, we now do find somewhat stronger
evidence for a concave relationship between income and air pollution for the 1990s.
5. Conclusions
Environmental quality continues to draw the attention of economists and society as
a whole. Recently, the discussion in the academic literature has started to focus on
Table 5 Final model—dependent variable: air pollution (LCO2PC)
Sample (1) (2) (3)
variable Full sample 1990s non-OECD
LGDPPC1 0.900** 2.133*** 0.313
(0.421) (0.532) (0.494)
LGDPPCSQ1 0.018 0.098*** 0.021
(0.025) (0.034) (0.031)
INDSHEMP1 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.019***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
LFERT1 0.109*** 0.045** 0.117***
(0.029) (0.019) (0.035)
DICT1 0.102* 0.012 0.070
(0.056) (0.061) (0.064)
INEQUAL1 0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Observations 855 510 515
Countries 109 96 87
Periods 17 8 17
R-Sq (within) 0.519 0.412 0.565
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000
EKC TP – 53,245 –
Note: ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-significance level.
‘1990s’ uses only the years 1990-99, ‘non-OECD’ excludes OECD countries. All estimations include
country- and time-specific fixed effects. Clustered standard errors are given in parentheses below the
coefficient. ‘F-test’ reports the p-value of an F-test on the joint significance of the coefficients of
LGDPPC1 and LGDPPCSQ1. ‘EKC TP’ represents the turning point of the EKC in constant 1995 US
$ per capita.
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political-institutional factors possibly determining pollution levels. Despite empir-
ical research investigating the impact of various economic, political, and demo-
graphic factors on pollution, however, there is no consensus over which of these
forces actually matter. This casts doubt on the general robustness of published
results. The present paper provides an overview and a thorough robustness analysis
of these and other determinants of pollution.
A first result, in line with the literature, is that we endorse the existence of an
environmental Kuznets curve for water pollution. Using various specifications, a
quadratic set-up correlating prosperity with water pollution suggests an inverted
U-shaped relationship within sample. Our estimated median turning point—US
$26,800 per capita GDP (in constant 1995 prices)—has already been reached by
several countries in our sample. In contrast, we find no evidence for the existence of
an EKC for air pollution. For levels of per capita GDP that are actually observed in
sample, no more than a concave relationship is found. From a policy point of view,
this suggests that it would be naive to bet on reaching a turning point which might
only be a statistical artifact. We have hardly any evidence that the air pollution
problem will solve itself and thus direct action may be required. In contrast to the
literature, this conclusion is supported by the analysis of thousands of different
models.
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Fig. 3 Per capita income elasticity of pollution (in constant 1995 US $)
Note: The figure is based on the results displayed in Tables 4 and 5, column (1).
Dashed lines denote 90% confidence bands. Markers represent existing observa-
tions for water pollution (circles) and air pollution (diamonds).
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Second, a number of variables related to the economic structure of a country
matter for its environmental quality. Especially employment-based indicators of
industrialization are highly significant and have the expected (positive) sign.
Furthermore, fertilizer consumption per hectare of arable land significantly
explains CO2 emission levels around the world.
Third, openness—as measured by the ratio of total trade over GDP—is not
related to the pollution level of an economy. Apparently, the claim that access to
‘greener’ technologies caused by globalization would lead to an improvement of
environmental quality is difficult to maintain. However, there does not seem to be
evidence in favour of the pollution haven hypothesis, either.
Fourth, demographic factors seem to be of minor importance.
Fifth, inequality increases environmental quality. In contrast to the mostly nega-
tive association so far in the literature, we confirm more recent model predictions
which state that there are indeed beneficial side-effects of income inequality on the
environmental quality. For instance, the declining importance of blue-collar work-
ers might tend to increase environmental regulation.
Sixth, recent interest in more politically motivated explanations of environmen-
tal quality does not appear to be a very promising path. In fact, only our dicta-
torship dummy appears robustly related to CO2 emissions; dictatorships are
associated with less air pollution per capita. Also, economic freedom seems to
increase water pollution. However, we have to admit that, due to the reduced
form characteristics of our set-up, this does not imply that there are no indirect
channels through which these political variables influence pollution.
It is important to point out some limitations of our approach. Our focus was to
provide an empirical assessment of previously proposed variables. It is well known
that focusing on reduced form estimations has the advantage of easy-to-obtain,
clear-cut results. However, this comes at the cost of potentially missing some indir-
ect transmission channels, or not being able to model the underlying dynamics in a
more sophisticated way. Therefore, further research in this field should, on the one
hand, reconsider and maybe blend some of the theoretical models that lead to the
inclusion of some of the variables we identify to be robust. On the other hand, our
results can be used as a starting point for setting up and estimating more struc-
turally based models that are able to capture potential indirect effects and deal with
the underlying dynamics. Hence, even though we believe our work is a major step
forward, there is still much more to be done in this field of research.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material (Appendix 2, Tables A3 and A4) is available online at the
OUP website.
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Appendix 1
Table A1 List of variables and their sources
Variable Sign Description Source
LBODPC Log of BOD (grams per day) per capita WDI (2003)
LCO2PC Log of CO2 Emissions (metric tons) per
capita
WDI (2003)
LSO2PC Log of SO2 Emissions (metric tons) per
capita
Stern (2005b)
DEMOC - Democracy Score: general openness of
political institutions
Gurr et al. (2003)
DICT ? Dummy variable for dictatorship (execu-
tive index of electoral competitiveness
<3)
Beck et al. (2001)
ECFREE - Fraser Economic Freedom Index Gwartney et al. (2003)
FDIGDP ? Net inflows of foreign direct investment
(% of GDP)
WDI (2003)
GDPGR ? GDP growth rate (annual %) WDI (2003)
ILLIT + Adult illiteracy rate (% of people ages 15
and above)
WDI (2003)
INDSHEMP + Employment in industry (% of total
employment)
WDI (2003)
INDSHGDP + Manufacturing value added (% of GDP) WDI (2003)
INEQUAL ? Industrial pay-inequality measure UTIP (2001)
LEFT ? Dummy variable for the party of the chief
executive being left-wing
Beck et al. (2001)
LFERT + Log of fertilizer use (100 grams per hec-
tare of arable land)
WDI (2003)
LGDPPC + Log of GDP (constant 1995 US $) per
capita
WDI (2003)
LGDPPCSQ - Squared log of real GDP per capita WDI (2003)
LGDPPCCB ? Cubic log of real GDP per capita WDI (2003)
LPOPDENS ? Log of population per hectare WDI (2003)
OILENERGY + Electricity production from oil sources
(% of total)
WDI (2003)
POLFREE - Average of the two Freedom House
indices
FHI (1999)
PRIMEDU - Gross primary school enrollment (% of
corresponding age group)
WDI (2003)
TRADE ? Trade intensity ((import+export)/GDP) WDI (2003)
URBAN ? Urban population (% of total) WDI (2003)
YRSOFFC + Number of years chief executive has been
in office
Beck et al. (2001)
Note: Variables are sorted alphabetically. ‘Sign’ refers to the expected sign: ‘+/-’ denotes a positive/
negative relation according to the literature while ‘?’ denotes an a priori ambiguous effect.
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